How Individuals Right of Clean Air Become Possible:Comment on the Constitutional Expression of Environmental Rights

doi:10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2020.06.006

Abstract

Abstract: Both Neil McCormick and Joseph Raz advocated that clean air could not become the object of individual rights.In contrast,DeniseRéaume，Jeremy Waldron and Andrei Marmor held opposite ideas.First of all,we should distinguish between "enjoyment" and "generation" of public goods.Secondly,we should distinguish between the public goods enjoyed independently by the individual and that shared by the collective.The non-exclusivity of enjoyment and the collectivity of enjoyment are two different characteristics.The non-exclusiveness of public goods does not prevent some public goods from becoming the object of individual rights.Whether the individual can enjoy some kind of public goods independently is the key to determine whether it can become the object of individual rights.As clean air and other public goods have individual independent enjoyment,individual citizens may theoretically have the right to clean air and other public goods.We can prove the existence of individual environmental rights through the interest theory of rights.Therefore,there should be no theoretical problem to include environmental rights in The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens,in Chapter II of the Constitution.

Key words: individual rights, environmental rights, clean air rights, public interest, public goods

WANG Xiaogang. How Individuals Right of Clean Air Become Possible:Comment on the Constitutional Expression of Environmental Rights[J]. Journal of Jishou University(Social Sciences Edition), 2020, 41(6): 48-55.

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