Abstract: Village is an important subject of the supply of public goods,and its supply efficiency is generally closely related to the supply capacity.However,the increase of the supply capacity of the village may not necessarily be transformed into the enhancement of supply willingness.Based on a field investigation in a village in the Pearl River Delta,through the construction of the three-dimensional analysis framework of villager-village-government,combined with a case analysis,this paper discusses the generating logic of the strategic supply behavior of public goods in villages with co-ownership of collective property rights.It is found that villages with developed collective economy have the supply capacity of public goods,but they shift the supply responsibility to the government,showing strategic supply behavior such as dependent strategic supply,shirking responsibility strategic supply,balanced strategic supply and coping strategic supply.This is the result of interweaving multiple factors,such as the villagers' protection of collective property rights,the "private property" of share ownership,the formal democracy of the village,and the ability of the government to dissolve and mobilize the weak embedded structure.The key to the turn lies in defining the boundary of the supply of government public goods,perfecting the independent supply system and reshaping the social capital of the village.

Key words: collective economy, co-ownership of collective property rights, public goods, village public goods, strategic supply