The Influence of Board Secretary's Shareholding on the Transparency of Accounting Information:An Empirical Study Based on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Share Listed Companies

doi:10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2021.04.016

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017,this paper studies the influence of board secretary's shareholding on the transparency of accounting information of listed companies,and further discusses the influence differences under different nature of ownership and theconcurrent appointment of board secretary.It is found that,compared with the listed companies in which the board secretary does not hold shares,the accounting information held by the board secretary is more transparent.This role mainly exists in non-state-owned enterprises,yet is not significant in state-owned enterprises.When the board secretary holds other senior positions,the shareholding of the board secretary plays a more significant role in improving the transparency of accounting information in listed companies.The above conclusion is still true after controlling the endogenesis.The research conclusion not only expands the relevant research on the shareholding incentive effect of the board secretary,but also has a certain reference value and practical significance for listed companies to improve the transparency of accounting information.

Key words: board secretary's shareholding, transparency of accounting information, information disclosure, listed companies

YANG Xianglin, WANG Yonghai. The Influence of Board Secretary's Shareholding on the Transparency of Accounting Information:An Empirical Study Based on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Share Listed Companies[J]. Journal of Jishou University(Social Sciences Edition), 2021, 42(4): 133-144.

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