Abstract: Family farm operators and smallholder farmers enter into land transfer contracts to consolidate fragmented farmland into contiguous plots,enabling large-scale and efficient agricultural production.However,during the contract period,some farmers may breach agreements or engage in "hold-up" behavior by demanding rent increases,thereby undermining the stability of land tenure rights.By analyzing the strategic interactions between family farm operators and farmers under different rent levels,this study identifies the conditions under which optimal strategies can emerge.First,at normal rent levels,increasing financial penalties for breaches while raising the opportunity cost of self-cultivation can effectively deter noncompliance.Second,under low-rent scenarios,from the farmers' perspective,raising both economic penalties and non-material costs—such as time and effort—and increasing the opportunity cost of abandoning contracted land to pursue independent farming help to discourage opportunistic renegotiation.From the family farm operators' perspective,a higher number and proportion of defaulting or hold-up farmers' narrow potential profit margins,raise subsequent production and management costs caused by mid-contract disruptions,and may lead to reductions in government subsidies.To ensure stable income for farmers,prevent breaches and rent gouging,and enhance tenure security,it is essential to make innovations in land transfer models that provide efficient pathways for land consolidation,to establish a dynamic adjustment mechanism for transfer income to build a strong mutual-interest relationship between farmers and farm operators,and to strengthen enforcement measures to promote stronger contractual discipline and trust in the land transfer process.

Key words: family farms, family farmer, tripartite division of rights, land transfer contracts, contract governance