Research on Reputation Mechanism,Contract Choice,and Self-performing of Oral Contract in Farmland Transfer

doi:10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2015.01.006

Abstract

Abstract: Through investigation to 221 farm households in Meitan County,Guizhou Province,a binary logistic model was constructed,and two issues,e.g.contract choice and self-performing of oral contract were researched from the perspective of reputation mechanism.The analysis shows that signal transmission effect,motivation and punishment effect,and network effect have promoted the importance of reputation,making it positively increase the choice rate of oral contract and contract self-performing rate in farmland transfer.Besides,the size of the transferred land is also a key factor:the larger the land is,the lower the oral contract rate will be,and so will be the contract self-performing rate.Finally,relative policies are put forward.

Key words: reputationmechanism, contract choice in farmland transfer, oral contract, self-compliance

HONG Ming-Yong, QIAN Long. Research on Reputation Mechanism,Contract Choice,and Self-performing of Oral Contract in Farmland Transfer[J]. Journal of Jishou University（Social Sciences）, 2015, 36(1): 34-43.

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