Abstract: Economic research has demonstrated that algorithms can achieve supra-competitive pricing without communication.Consequently,there have been increasing calls for the adoption of a more stringent regulatory framework within antitrust law to address algorithmic tacit collusion.This proposed regulatory stance,however,tends to blur the distinction between economics and competition law,misinterprets the inherent neutrality of tacit collusion within the realm of antitrust law,and skews the perception of the neutrality of algorithmic technology.Tacit collusion is actually an intermediate state between unilateral conduct and monopoly agreements,and its outcome,viewed as economic phenomena,inherently embody a degree of neutrality under antitrust law,necessitating evaluation based on plus factors.While algorithms provide the technical infrastructure conducive to tacit collusion,the technology itself remains neutral.Algorithmic tacit collusion does not exceed the original mechanism of implied collusion,nor does it necessarily result in new competitive harm.Therefore,antitrust law should not expand its regulatory scope in response to algorithmic tacit collusion,but should continue to adhere to regulatory approaches within the traditional framework.

Key words: algorithm, tacit collusion, antitrust, price parallelism, plus factors, technology neutrality