Collection Efficiency of Basic Endowment Insurance Funds for Urban Employees:A Study Based on Dynamic Panel Threshold Model

doi:10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2023.02.003

Abstract

Abstract: Using the statistical data of the collection of basic endowment insurance funds for urban employees in 31 provinces in China from 2010 to 2015,this paper empirically investigates the impact of regional institutional alimony rate on the collection efficiency of endowment insurance funds by using the dynamic panel threshold model.It is found that there is an inverted "U" curve relationship between the regional institutional alimony rate and the collection efficiency of endowment insurance funds,and that there is a single threshold value.When the institutional alimony rate is lower than this value,the local government will take the initiative to bear the main responsibility for making up the gap of the endowment insurance fund,and when the institutional alimony rate exceeds this value,the local government will transfer the main responsibility for making up the gap of the endowment insurance fund to the central government,thus weakening the collection efficiency of the endowment insurance fund.After the robustness tests such as replacing the explained variable and using instrumental variable method,this conclusion is still valid.The study offers a new explanation for the inefficient collection to the basic endowment insurance funds for urban employees in China,emphasizing the important role of local governments in collaborative collection and supervision.

Key words: endowment insurance fund;institutional alimony rate;collection , efficiency;system GMM method;dynamic panel threshold model

LONG Zhaoyang, LIANG Yangyang. Collection Efficiency of Basic Endowment Insurance Funds for Urban Employees:A Study Based on Dynamic Panel Threshold Model[J]. Journal of Jishou University(Social Sciences Edition), 2023, 44(2): 19-30.

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