The Achilles’ Heel of Patent Law and Its Solutions

doi:10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2016.01.008

Abstract

Abstract:

Technological innovation,which is the engine of economic development,is encouraged by patent law through market profits of invention.However,when the anticipated profits of invention are lower or less than the investment,patent law cannot achieve its purpose of encouraging innovation.Thus,the market profits of invention under patent law are its Achilles’ heel.To overcome the shortcomings of patent law,the policy tool and law adopted by the stateare diversified,including the public fund,R&D credit and so on.With different territory，different institutions have different returns and costs,leading to different influence among the society and the innovators.Thus,it is necessary to uphold the basic role of patent law,and meanwhile to take other laws seriously.This is the criterion to reform the patent law,and is also the starting point to perfect other laws to encourage innovation.

Key words: technological innovation, patent law, public fund, R&, D credit

LIANG Zhi-Wen. The Achilles’ Heel of Patent Law and Its Solutions[J]. Journal of Jishou University（Social Sciences）, 2016, 37(1): 58-69.

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