Abstract: Executive excessive perquisites are a typical manifestation of implicit corruption,severely damaging company value.This study conducts an empirical investigation on the impact of customer concentration on executive excessive perquisites using the data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2019.The results indicate that the higher the customer concentration of a company,the lower the degree of executive excessive perquisites,and this finding holds after a series of robustness tests.Mechanism tests reveal that when customer concentration increases,corporate information asymmetry decreases and management's risk perception strengthens,thereby suppressing executive excessive perquisites.Heterogeneity analysis shows that when customer supervisory capacity and willingness are strong,and executives face higher equity and promotion incentives,the inhibitory effect of customer concentration on executive excessive perquisites is more pronounced.Economic consequence tests reveal that customer concentration suppresses executive excessive perquisites,thereby reducing agency costs.

Key words: customer concentration, executive excessive perquisites, stakeholders, management risk perception, information asymmetry