From Market Governance to Self-governance:Retrospect and Prospect of Common-pool Resources Governance Theories

doi:10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2016.06.008

Abstract

Abstract: Due to their exclusiveness and non-competitiveness,common-pool resources are often faced with the threat of “the tragedy of commons”.To solve this problem effectively，market governance emphasizes privatization and clearly- defined property rights，thus avoiding the “free rider” problem.Government regulations are focused on the nationalization to solve the market failure.Breaking through the “market-government” dichotomy，self-governance depends on the appropriators’ autonomous action and institution construction to prevent excessive exploitation and utilization of common-pool resources.Under the general trend of global governance，applying self-governance theory to the new field，such as the high seas，polar and other international common-pool resource governance，can be seen as the latest research agenda in the future.

Key words: common-pool resources, market governance, government regulations, self-governance, review

BAO Wenhan，ZHANG Ming. From Market Governance to Self-governance:Retrospect and Prospect of Common-pool Resources Governance Theories[J]. Journal of Jishou University（Social Sciences）, DOI: 10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2016.06.008.

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