吉首大学学报(社会科学版)

• 管理学研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

生态政绩考评失灵与环保督察——规制地方政府间“共谋”关系的制度改革逻辑

盛明科,李代明   

  1. (湘潭大学 公共管理学院,湖南 湘潭 411105)
  • 出版日期:2018-07-01 发布日期:2018-06-28
  • 作者简介:盛明科,男,博士,湘潭大学公共管理学院教授,博士生导师。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(18VSJ101);全国宣传文化系统“四个一批”人才工程委托项目(03KH/KH01149)

The Failure of Ecological Performance Evaluation and Environmental Supervision——Institutional Reform Logic of Regulating the "Collusion" Relationship among Local Governments

SHENG Mingke,LI Daiming   

  1. (Collegeof Public Administration,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,Hunan China)
  • Online:2018-07-01 Published:2018-06-28

摘要:生态环境保护与治理是国家治理的重要内容,常规式治理与运动式治理是解决生态环境治理问题最为常见的两种机制。运动式治理机制因常规式治理机制失灵而启动并通过嵌入性控制来实现组织目标。生态政绩考评试图通过例行的考评机制来引导和调控地方政府及官员的施政行为。这种机制因存在委托-代理风险、央地目标冲突、绩效结果激励约束强度小等问题,容易导致地方政府间的生态环境治理“共谋行为”的产生,亟须可替代性的治理机制来实现可行的和有效的治理。为此,环保督察应运而生并成为调控生态环境治理节奏的显性机制;通过嵌入性控制能够有效遏制生态政绩考评失灵,规制地方政府间的“共谋行为”,实现对地方政府环境治理行为的有效控制。

关键词: 生态政绩考评, 共谋行为, 控制权, 环保督察

Abstract: Ecological environment protection and governance is an important part of national governance.Conventional governance and movement governance are the two most common mechanisms to solve the problems of ecological environment governance.Due to the failure of the conventional governance mechanism,movement governance mechanism starts and realizes the organizational goals through embedded control.Ecological performance evaluation attempts to guide and regulate the administrative behavior of local governments and officials through the routine appraisal mechanism.This kind of mechanism has the problems of principal-agent risk,conflict of central and local targets,and small incentive intensity of performance results,which easily leads to the emergence of the "collusion behavior" of the ecological environment governance among local governments,so it requires an alternative governance mechanism to achieve viable and effective governance.Therefore,environmental inspectors have emerged as the dominant mechanism to regulate the rhythm of ecological environment governance.Through embedded control,the failure of ecological performance evaluation can be effectively curbed,and the "collusion behavior"among local governments can be regulated to realize the effective control of the local government's environmental governance behavior.

Key words: ecological performance evaluation, collusion behavior, control rights, environmental supervision

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