从市场治理到自主治理：公共资源治理理论研究回顾与展望

doi:10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2016.06.008

摘要/Abstract

摘要：公共资源由于其非排他性和竞争性的特征经常面临“公地悲剧”的威胁。针对如何对公共资源实行有效治理来避免“公地悲剧”的问题，市场治理强调对公共资源进行私有化和界定清晰的产权，从而避免“搭便车”的问题。政府规制侧重对公共资源进行国有化来解决市场失灵的问题。自主治理突破了过去理论中“市场—政府”二分的思维，强调依靠资源占用者的自发行动和制度构建来避免公共资源的过度开发和利用，开辟了公共资源治理新的路径。在未来的研究中，自主治理理论可以继续从拓展理论深度、扩宽应用范围和创新政策实践三个角度来丰富公共资源治理的理论和实践。

关键词： 公共资源, 市场治理, 政府规制, 自主治理, 综述

Abstract: Due to their exclusiveness and non-competitiveness,common-pool resources are often faced with the threat of “the tragedy of commons”.To solve this problem effectively，market governance emphasizes privatization and clearly- defined property rights，thus avoiding the “free rider” problem.Government regulations are focused on the nationalization to solve the market failure.Breaking through the “market-government” dichotomy，self-governance depends on the appropriators’ autonomous action and institution construction to prevent excessive exploitation and utilization of common-pool resources.Under the general trend of global governance，applying self-governance theory to the new field，such as the high seas，polar and other international common-pool resource governance，can be seen as the latest research agenda in the future.

Key words: common-pool resources, market governance, government regulations, self-governance, review

鲍文涵，张明. 从市场治理到自主治理：公共资源治理理论研究回顾与展望[J]. 吉首大学学报（社会科学版）, DOI: 10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2016.06.008.

BAO Wenhan，ZHANG Ming. From Market Governance to Self-governance:Retrospect and Prospect of Common-pool Resources Governance Theories[J]. Journal of Jishou University（Social Sciences）, DOI: 10.13438/j.cnki.jdxb.2016.06.008.

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